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Introduction
Students of anthropologies of Africa would have frequently heard the 
everyday expression, ‘one leg does not dance alone’. Many Africans often 
like to reiterate the collective nature of their endeavours, even if this is not 
always the case, so that, to return to the proverb, the origin and durability, 
type and size, and gender and colour of the second leg does not matter, 
so long as the dance can be performed. The late Terence Ranger designated 
this sense of practical reasoning to face diverse life events as ‘creative and 
resilient pluralism’, which is embedded in histories of contradiction and 
contestation through appropriation and innovation. He suggested that 
such practical sense ‘helps to explain the remarkable adaptability of 
African societies and individuals during changes of colonial capitalism’.1 
The implications of this adaptive capacity should also include how 
Africans shaped the actions of colonial officials and their policies, to the 
extent that the exiguous state bureaucracy that the European colonisers 
1  Ranger, ‘The Local and Global in Southern African Religious History’, 73.
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attempted to implement sometimes emerged out of ‘ongoing negotiations 
and compromises with Africans and among themselves’.2 The processes 
of negotiation, notwithstanding colonial violence, led colonial officials to 
subtly consume powers generated in the marginal worlds of the colonies 
so that they sometimes acted by violently persecuting and punishing 
alleged witches, which colonial laws had denied ontological reality.3 
In other contexts, the colonised were instructed to codify their ‘customs’, 
yet unlike the colonisers who regarded custom as ‘ahistorical, static 
and to some degree unchangeable’, the Malaitans (Solomon Islands), 
for instance, regarded their own created kastom as ‘dynamic, flexible, 
and rapidly changing’.4
If I take these ethnohistorical analyses seriously, there are no strong 
reasons to dwell on hybridity given that the contacts among the colonised 
and between the colonised and colonial state agents and missionaries was 
never preceded by a state of being ‘pure’.5 Instead, my focus is on what 
I term post-hybridity bargaining whereby in Mozambique war survivors, 
community leaders and spiritual agents sometimes negotiate with 
state authorities the terms of their relations. Occasionally they ignore, 
gamble with or manipulate one another and state authorities for securing 
personal and culturally meaningful forms of accountability. In turn, state 
authorities also shift between taking diverse community agents seriously 
to ignoring, manipulating or exerting violence upon them as part of 
their attempts to shun accountability. The bricolage arrangements that 
shape these relations are not permanent, neither can they be predicted. 
Therefore, the focus should be on the politics of rebuilding social life in 
communities in conflict by analysing the shifting qualities of alliances 
made by diverse individuals and institutional and non-institutional 
groups, contingent modes of struggle and various meanings of violence. 
This type of comprehensive analysis unseats the current focus of hybridity 
which hastily assumes a permanent state of co-existing and overlapping 
political orders, predictable in their modus operandi.
My analysis is based on nearly two decades of intermittent research 
conducted in diverse locations in Mozambique, a country that was 
involved in a protracted civil war from 1976 to 1992. State authorities 
2  Spear, ‘Neo-traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’, 26.
3  Fields, Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa; Luongo, Witchcraft and Colonial Rule; 
Mesaki, ‘Witchcraft and the Law’.
4  Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom, 6–7.
5  Stockhammer, ‘Questioning Hybridity’.
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have over time denied justice for serious offences perpetrated during 
the war. However, my systematic focus is on the centre of the country, 
which since 2013 has been exposed to a new military conflict between 
the Frelimo Government and the armed wing of the Renamo party. For 
almost two decades, I conducted research in Gorongosa, a rural district 
with a predominantly agriculture-based economy.6 The majority of 
people speak ‘Chi-Gorongose’, and a minority also speak Portuguese. 
The region features political, legal and religious pluralism through the 
evolving presence of various local cultural groups, Christian and Muslim 
denominations, formal civil society organisations and state institutions.
The politics of hybridity in marginal worlds
Contemporary political analysts and policymakers have long attempted 
to explain the configurations of modern state institutions and political 
and economic orders in numerous non-Western societies around the 
world. Given enduring political instability, weak implementation of 
state institutions in national territories, and state incapacity to generate 
meaningful order, halt the impacts of cyclical famine and better control 
the spread of preventable diseases and violence, some analysts have 
labelled these states as fragile or failed states.7 These labels have generated 
further responses among academics that have either reinforced them 
by exploring the array of causes that sustain state fragility or contested 
them by advancing alternative explanations to the seeming state failure. 
Of  interest in this analysis is the notion of hybridity, which has taken 
the form of hybrid political orders,8 and hybrid state perspectives and the 
paradigm of the transplanted state.9
Proponents of the ‘hybrid political orders’ concept developed it to 
counter top-down approaches to statebuilding.10 At the centre of these 
approaches are beliefs that statebuilding around the world should be 
modelled along the  discipline of the modern Western state and that 
prevailing fragile and failed states in marginal worlds constitute obstacles 
for peace and development. Alternatively, bottom-up approaches are 
6  Igreja et al., ‘Agricultural Cycle and the Prevalence of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’.
7  François and Sud, ‘Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States’.
8  Boege et al., ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States’; Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and 
Political Community’.
9  Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works.
10  Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community’.
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highlighted in order to account for local resources, agents and dynamics 
involved in the production of hybrid political orders.11 It is suggested that 
in hybrid political orders, ‘diverse and competing claims to power and 
logics of order coexist, overlap and intertwine, namely the logic of the 
“formal” state, of traditional “informal” societal order and of globalization 
and associated social fragmentation (which is present in ethnic, tribal, 
religious forms)’.12 This basic application of the notion of hybridity is 
useful in its attempts to tame the universal modelling and appetites of 
the proponents of the Weberian state. The problems with, and limits of, 
hybridity are highlighted by those scholars who have taken a genealogical 
approach to this concept as well as an ethnohistorical analysis of the 
encounters of Western European colonial officials and missionaries with 
social institutions and actors in non-Western worlds. Additionally, the 
limits are exposed when the concept is used to advance explanations of 
all peacebuilding and accountability processes around the world. In such 
attempts, the unpredictability, contradictions and limits of state and non-
state actors and approaches and the struggle that traverses the rusting 
and essentialisation of boundaries tend to be overlooked for the sake of 
identifying two seemingly clear-cut camps—namely, state institutions and 
non-state actors—which coalesce to produce a putative state of hybridity.
The late Patrick Chabal and his collaborator Jean-Pascal Daloz 
acknowledged that Africa experienced major sociopolitical transformations 
during the colonial expansion, as well as continuities in political practice 
from the pre- to the postcolonial period.13 Yet they argued that the 
European state apparatus that was transplanted to colonial Africa was 
different from that existing in the metropolis and it had distinct purposes. 
The historical analysis of colonial investment in most of the colonial 
worlds did not go ‘beyond what was required to maintain order and 
a steady supply of plantation laborers and to collect taxes’.14 For example, 
the institutionalisation of property rights was absent from the colonial 
projects of statebuilding in much of Africa and Asia.15 Thus the notion 
of hybridity, which suggests an encounter between ‘genuinely different 
societal sources that follow different logics’16 and some subsequent 
11  Ibid.; Brown et al., ‘Challenging Statebuilding as Peacebuilding’.
12  Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community’, 606.
13  Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works.
14  Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom, 5; Chabal and Daloz, 
Africa Works, 12.
15  Doyle, ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, 465.
16  Boege et al., ‘Building Peace and Political Community’, 606.
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transformation evolving out of this encounter and post-encounter 
dynamics makes little sense. The ideal type of the bureaucratic state 
‘essentially remained a myth of the colonial mission’17 and can hardly 
account for some kind of meaningful hybrid outcome.
Thus, ‘the paradigm of the hybrid state cannot be taken at face value since 
the very colonial state which was re-appropriated and re-shaped after 
independence hardly qualified as a modern Western institution in the first 
place. The colonial state was but superficially akin to its Western model.’18 
Colonial officials manipulated local values and organisation logics for 
maximising the exploitation of the colonies; in their turn, local elites also 
employed the diffuse colonial ideas of institutionalisation to protect their 
sources of power and advance their interests.19 Furthermore, while there 
has been a major tendency to neglect accounting for the role of women 
in these colonial and postcolonial political struggles, recent historical 
reanalysis based on archive materials,20 and feminist analysis,21 has 
contributed to shifting the current imbalances in women’s contribution 
to world history and politics of making and breaking boundaries.22
Post-hybridity bargaining
The notion that ‘a person is never complete’ is a popular saying in 
Gorongosa as in many parts of Africa. The implications of this recognition 
is that many people in Gorongosa and around Africa keep inventing new 
techniques and medicines not to create a sense of completeness. Instead, 
these new but ephemeral creations are instrumental to reveal the various 
sources of incompleteness, and women often figure prominently in 
these revelations.23 Unfortunately, these cultural realities and historical 
developments have not figured in the analysis of the advocators of 
hybridity. Yet it is indisputable that the notion of hybridity has gained 
popular currency. It has allowed an easy and rapid circulation of 
17  Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 12.
18  Ibid., 13.
19  Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the Origins of Malaitan Kastom; Fields, Revival and 
Rebellion; Luongo, Witchcraft and Colonial Rule; Mesaki, ‘Witchcraft and the Law in Tanzania’; Pels, 
A Politics of Presence.
20  Thornton, ‘Legitimacy and Political Power’; Vilhena, Gungunhana.
21  Nye, Feminism and Modern Philosophy.
22  Argenti-Pillen, Masking Terror; Igreja and Dias-Lambranca, ‘The Thursdays as They Live’.
23  Igreja, ‘Negotiating Order in Postwar Mozambique’.
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knowledge of statecraft in certain sectors of higher academia as well as 
among policymakers of foreign affairs in industrialised nations interested, 
perhaps, in finding ‘scientific’ labels and justifications for taxpayers’ 
money invested in those seemingly hybrid politics in marginal worlds. 
In this regard, I do not intend to further ruminate about the missed 
opportunities among scholars of hybridity. Instead, I suggest a move 
towards post-hybridity bargaining to acknowledge the flash popularity of 
the hybridity turn, but above all to properly account for the multifaceted 
outlook of power struggles that have unfolded in the production of 
embodied accountability for serious offences committed during the civil 
war in Mozambique.
Plunging in post-hybridity ventures is necessary because none of the 
various participants that I have analysed make enduring claims of 
representing distinct and permanent values that clash, conquer and 
subdue others’ values.24 Instead, the reality of the various participants and 
structures evolves in a context of floating boundaries, which has been 
variously acknowledged through the proverbs ‘a person is never complete’, 
‘one leg does not dance alone’ and by a state police officer, who once told 
me during a conversation about witchcraft: ‘As a police officer I do not 
believe [in witchcraft], but as a human being I believe’.25 The notion that 
in one regime (witchcraft) a person (police) can be immune to submission 
and exert domination over others as well as be consumed with fear and 
paralysis (human being) cannot be captured by the notion of hybridity. 
Human beings mix and enforce boundaries as part of diverse struggles, 
which depend on what is at stake in each instance. From this perspective, 
some of the details about the struggles for accountability that I consider 
here may be specific to Mozambique, yet also demonstrate broader 
features of global struggles for justice. Internationally, there have been 
recurrent discussions over how to address culpability in contexts of serious 
offences. Over the past 30 years, national and international institutions 
have deployed legal mechanisms to allow witnesses to give testimonies 
of serious offences committed during repressive dictatorships and wars.26 
However, there is often a sense of incompleteness surrounding these official 
practices; for many war survivors in Mozambique, and more broadly in 
24  Igreja, ‘Testimonies of Suffering and Recasting the Meanings of Memories of Violence in Post-war 
Mozambique’.
25  Igreja, ‘Memories of Violence, Cultural Transformations of Cannibals, and Indigenous State-
Building in Post-conflict Mozambique’, 787.
26  Hayner, Unspeakable Truths.
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sub-Saharan Africa, justice and wellbeing and injustice and illness are 
related, such that addressing injustice and illness entails confronting 
not only the visible and quantifiable dimensions of evil but also the 
mechanisms and agents believed to be involved in its perpetuation.27
Imaginaries of violence in colonial 
and postcolonial Mozambique
The colonisation of Mozambique by the Portuguese colonial regime 
occurred through military, political-economic, legal and religious 
means. Portuguese colonial officials manipulated some of the traditional 
authorities known as regulo that led to the deployment of some of them 
as village collaborators of the colonisers. Regulo is the common name 
for the position of the highest chief in a village. The name regulo was 
created by the  Portuguese colonialists but it survived the postcolonial 
metamorphosis in Mozambique. Yet some local leaders resisted while 
others were co-opted and still others joined Portuguese officials for their 
own self-interest, to acquire more power and defeat their local rivals. It is 
noteworthy that the mother of Ngungunhane, the feared emperor of the 
Gaza Empire (1824–1895), plotted with Mouzinho de Albuquerque, 
captain of the Portuguese cavalry in colonial Mozambique, to remove her 
son from power as he had become erratic and staged violent acts and 
killed many of his own people without clear imperial purposes.28
In central Mozambique, people’s memories of colonisation usually 
focus on some of the actions of the Portuguese administrators and the 
cipaios, who were a group of African men used by the colonial officials as 
policemen to violently coerce the local populations into paying the hut 
tax and force them into labour camps.29 These cipaios mimicked some 
aspects of African magic by adopting nicknames that evoked cultural 
imagery and ritual violence in order to legitimise colonial power.30 
The cipaios instilled fear in people, who were also ambivalent about the 
cipaios’ violence. This was partly because of the ritualised nature of some 
27  Igreja, ‘Intersections of Sensorial Perception and Imagination in Divination Practices in Post-war 
Mozambique’.
28  Vilhena, Gungunhana.
29  Carvalho, A Guerra que Portugal Quis Esquecer; cf. Akin, Colonialism, Maasina Rule, and the 
Origins of Malaitan Kastom.
30  Igreja and Skaar, ‘“A Conflict Does Not Rot”’.
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of the violence and because of the cipaios’ determination and sense of 
responsibility and loyalty to their colonial masters during the fulfilment 
of their duties. The cipaios persecuted individuals who failed to pay the 
hut tax and fugitives accused of committing serious offences and brought 
them to the colonial administrator who rendered official justice himself, 
instead of ‘a magistrate sitting in a court of law’ as was the case in Europe.31 
In spite of working for the colonisers, the cipaios’ sense of commitment and 
courage lured the local populations which culminated in the integration 
of the figure of the cipaio into the category of spirits named mucipai 
(plural of cipaio in Chi-Gorongose language) in the apparatus of local 
healers. Mucipai resisted the erosion of time and are the spirits that help 
healers to search for clients in a rather similar logic of the cipaio who used 
to uncompromisingly hunt his prey.
In 1962 the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique; Frelimo) was founded to wage a war for independence 
against the Portuguese. The country attained independence in June 1975 
at the height of the Cold War. As in other socialist-inspired revolutions, 
the Mozambican state officials appeared versed in so-called ‘scientific 
socialism’; they banned various religious and cultural practices and 
arrested and executed individuals believed to be involved in ‘obscurantist 
practices’ and regarded as ‘enemies of the people’.32 The legacies of the 
colonial rivalries among various nationalist groups in tandem with the 
postcolonial revolutionary excesses and the politics of the Cold War gave 
birth to a civil war (1976–1992) that pitted the Frelimo Government 
against the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana; Renamo).
It has been estimated that one million people died and four million 
became internally displaced persons and refugees. Both armies fought 
for the control of populations in order to sustain the war. People under 
government control lived in communal villages, whereas people in Renamo 
areas lived in madembes (old residences). Renamo took advantage of the 
resentment harboured by the local leaders and their people and allowed 
local leaders, healers and Christian churches to operate in their zones of 
control. Throughout the country were numerous reports of abductions of 
men and women, and children were used as soldiers; there were frequent 
31  Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, 12.
32  Igreja, ‘Frelimo’s Political Ruling through Violence and Memory in Postcolonial Mozambique’; 
West, Kupilikula.
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reports of forced marriage of young girls, and sexual violence against 
women.33 Some parents compelled their young children (boys and girls) 
to hasten marriage as a potential protection against humiliation and loss 
resulting from rape, while other young girls did ku toera mabota (‘go after 
the boots’, meaning soldiers, to flirt with them) to survive.34
Cultural and religious rituals were as much implicated in the making of 
war as of peace.35 During the early years of the civil war, Renamo soldiers 
used piça wega (burn yourself ). After assaulting a communal village, the 
soldiers compelled the people to remove valuable objects (related to magic) 
from inside their huts and then forced them to set their huts on fire. 
This was to prevent the soldiers and the villagers from being persecuted 
and afflicted by magical spells. Burning the huts was a violent act and 
dispossessed the people, but the burning took into account people’s magical 
and religious traditions. The recognition of magic and the necessity to act 
accordingly also revealed the soldiers’ sense of fear in relation to the power 
of local traditions. Such a posture conferred a measure of legitimacy to the 
broader purpose of the war on the side of Renamo.
The civil war was aggravated by periods of severe drought and ensuing 
famine, particularly in 1987–1988 and 1990–1992, which claimed many 
lives. At the war’s end, war survivors attempted to forgive and forget and 
move on without accountability. Yet forgetfulness was not always possible 
as war survivors were compelled through cultural processes to address 
their deeply unsettled divisions as a basis for a life in common.36
Peace agreement: Spaces of autonomy 
and amnesty law
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
at the end of the 1980s the Frelimo Government engaged in regime 
change. It adopted a democratic constitution in 1990, which expanded 
citizens’ rights by recognising cultural and religious pluralism, freedom 
of  expression, economic liberalisation and a multi-party democratic 
system. Through two years (1990–1992) of brokered negotiations, 
33  Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story; Schafer, Soldiers at Peace.
34  Igreja, ‘Media and Legacies of War’.
35  Lubkemann, Culture in Chaos.
36  Igreja, ‘Cultural Disruption and the Care of Infants in Post-war Mozambique’.
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Renamo was swayed to recognise the legitimacy of state institutions under 
Frelimo rule and the Acordo Geral de Paz (General Peace Agreement), 
consisting of seven protocols, was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992. 
The Frelimo Government agreed to attribute a space of autonomy for the 
traditional structures of governance, which created a dual ruling regime 
and was sealed in Protocol V ‘On Guarantees’ of the peace agreement.
Protocol V of the General Peace Agreement created pluralist and 
decentralised spaces whereby war survivors could engage in serious, albeit 
unpredictable, struggles for a whole range of rights including, although 
not stipulated, accountability for wartime offences. Yet 10 days following 
the signature of the peace agreement, the Frelimo Government passed 
an unconditional amnesty law (Law 15/92) exempting everyone involved 
in  the civil war from criminal prosecution.37 The amnesty law was 
followed by legal reforms that were publicly intended to create democratic 
institutions and practices based on scientific methods.38 Of particular 
relevance for this analysis was the development of legal provisions that 
granted further autonomy to community leaders,39 namely the Decree 
Law 15/2000 of the Autoridade Comunitária (Community Authority), 
which legally recognised various community leaders.40 Within this 
context various civil society organisations were legally formalised such as 
one of traditional healers, known as Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais 
de Moçambique. Yet over time when the Frelimo Government realised 
that it was no longer harvesting the dividends of decentralised politics 
through control of politics at community level, the party cadres legally 
reverted to centralised modes of ruling.41
Pluralist social orders and embodied 
accountability
The state amnesty law did not manage to silence war survivors nor 
put a lid on struggles for accountability in postconflict Mozambique 
because of the pluralist nature of perceptions and practices of social 
orders, disorders, wellbeing and illness, justice and injustice. Ironically, 
37  Hayner, Unspeakable Truths; Igreja, ‘Amnesty Law’.
38  Igreja, ‘Memories of Violence’, 780.
39  Igreja and Skaar, ‘“A Conflict Does Not Rot”’.
40  Kyed, ‘The Politics of Legal Pluralism’; West, Kupilikula.
41  Igreja, ‘Politics of Memory, Decentralisation and Recentralisation in Mozambique’.
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the Frelimo Government and main opposition party, Renamo, were 
also not successful in their vows to forget the past and focus solely on 
development. The newly created multi-party parliament was established 
in 1995 and mirrored a melting pot of diverse and hastily digested 
institutional influences and practices of the colonial minimalist state 
structures, Frelimo’s postcolonial revolutionary enthusiasm and excesses, 
and the civil war techniques of psychological warfare. As the new multi-
party parliament initiated activities, both parties broke the silence and 
used memories as weapons that denied one another political legitimacy.42 
Yet when parliamentary discussions focus on salaries and other member 
privileges, both Frelimo and Renamo parties speak in unison, and regard 
one another as brothers. This behaviour provides further evidence of how 
the divisions and symbiosis are not permanent.
At the community level and in war-torn regions such as Gorongosa, 
struggles for justice were manifested through protracted family conflicts 
and severe bodily symptoms triggered by the spirits of the dead, which 
returned to the realm of the living to disturb the alleged perpetrators and 
their kin.43 In this regard, accountability is an embodied phenomenon, in 
the sense that it is inseparable from the lived experiences of war survivors, 
their relatives and postwar generations. Embodied accountability means 
that alleged perpetrators and their victims become tied through the 
suffering that shatters their bodies and everyday lives, thereby compelling 
both perpetrator and victim and their kin to act in the pursuit of truth 
and justice.44 The victim seeks justice in local cultural terms, whereas 
the alleged perpetrator seeks resolution because he or she lives with 
a  reputation of embodying tserusso. Tserusso means that the individual 
is often suspected of being an evil person. Such a reputation amounts 
to a form of social incarceration. The imprisoned person is known to be 
enveloped in a world of tchidimadima (mystery), which severely limits the 
person’s pursuit of a life of communality and dignity. Since persons are 
not understood as autonomous individuals, ‘but as nodes in systems of 
relationships’,45 serious violations also affect the wellbeing of the kin group 
of the alleged perpetrator, so that certain forms of guilt are also collective. 
Thus, in this sociocultural setting, health and illness is inextricably linked 
to the sense of justice and injustice, and certain experiences of illness and 
42  Igreja, ‘Memories as Weapons’.
43  Cf. Mueggler, The Age of Wild Ghosts.
44  Igreja, ‘Legacies of War, Healing, Justice and Social Transformation in Mozambique’.
45  Ferguson, ‘Declarations of Dependence’, 226.
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injustice are expressed in ways that escape the control of the suffering 
person and kin group. From this perspective, it is useful to think in terms 
of post-hybridity bargaining because it is not possible to predict when 
the embodied accountability will be placed en demarche for everyone to 
see and act accordingly. While it is known that embodied accountability 
can be expressed through the mediation of spirits of the dead in male 
and female bodies (although more prominently female bodies), still it is 
impossible to know beforehand which alliances (or no alliances) will be 
mobilised among community leaders, Christian and Islamic leaders, state 
police and judicial courts in order to attempt a resolution for war-related 
unresolved conflicts.46
In this region, the spirits are regarded as persons with their own volition,47 
and their rules are regarded as possessing autonomy from and power 
over the living. This conception evokes forms of personhood, whereby 
agency and subjectivity are also attributed to spiritual and natural agents, 
and these are continuously negotiated with the living.48 The rules of the 
spirits and the changing customs of the living determine the seriousness 
of a breach and the type of resolution that should be followed. The most 
serious offences occur when people die from unjust death triggered by 
physical violence, extreme negligence or refusal to provide care. Such 
cases are considered as serious offences and unforgivable unless there is 
resolution. The rule is micero ai vundi—a conflict does not rot or disappear 
until it has been redressed.49
Gamba spirits, embodied accountability 
and post-hybridity bargaining
In the past two decades, I have had the opportunity to witness diverse 
struggles for accountability. The majority of accountability cases I came 
across were related to serious offences perpetrated during the civil war. 
Following the civil war, gamba (plural magamba) spirits came to take over 
processes of war-related accountability. Gamba refers to spirits of male 
46  Igreja, ‘Traditional Courts and the Struggle against State Impunity for Civil Wartime Offences 
in Mozambique’.
47  Boddy, Wombs and Alien Spirits; Kwon, Ghosts of War in Vietnam; Lambek, Knowledge and 
Practice in Mayotte; Masquelier, Prayer Has Spoiled Everything.
48  Igreja, ‘The Politics of Peace, Justice and Healing in Post-war Mozambique’.
49  Igreja and Skaar, ‘“A Conflict Does Not Rot”’.
175
10 . POST-HyBRIDITy BARGAINING AND EMBODIED ACCOUNTABILITy IN COMMUNITIES
soldiers who died during the civil war. Following the war, gamba spirits 
became vengeful and demanded justice for wartime violations. These spirits 
also evolve to use the bodies of some of their hosts, particularly women, 
to work as gamba healers.50 In this regard, women have become central to 
processes of coming to terms with the diverse legacies of a modern warfare 
as it was waged in the country’s war theatres. Gamba spirits bear witness to 
some of the grisly events that unfolded in the context of tripartite relations 
involving soldiers, families and communities. These spirits prefer to speak 
through the bodies of the alleged wrongdoers or their relatives, and this is 
manifested through altered state of consciousness, which paves the way for 
voicing indictments against alleged perpetrators. Following gamba spirit 
possession episodes, the spirit’s host gets post-facto amnesia (unable  to 
recall what happened). Gamba spirits refuse the attempts of the local people 
and central government authorities to discreetly appease them; they want 
accountability through public indictments and deliberations to denounce 
the culprits of serious offences perpetrated during the civil war. If such 
performances are not offered, the host is doomed to suffer. The continuity 
of torment is part of the local ethic of reciprocity, which holds that 
conflicts stemming from serious injuries leading to death continue unless 
they are appropriately redressed. Specifically, during possession, gamba 
spirits publicly re-enact war-related events, make indictments and, while 
doing so, are violent towards the host’s patri-kin. To the audience these 
performances evoke war memories that had been hidden and for the host/
patient these performances evince severe suffering.
While it is known that present circumstances, often involving ongoing 
social suffering and interpersonal conflicts, can trigger serious disputes 
about violent events from the civil war, these circumstances do not 
determine whether disputes will escalate into open conflict centred on 
accusations of wartime offences. The manifestation of open conflicts, 
often mediated by gamba spirits, can mean that the parties involved 
failed to reach a compromise which could have entailed staging public 
performances of acknowledgement of wrongdoing.51 Depending on the 
severity of the problem and in case one of the parties refuses to collaborate, 
the plaintiffs can increase their bargaining power by consulting a healer, 
community court, religious authorities or the offices of the state police 
and judicial court.52
50  Igreja, ‘Mozambique’.
51  Igreja, ‘“Why Are There So Many Drums Playing until Dawn?”’.
52  Igreja and Racin, ‘The Politics of Spirits, Justice, and Social Transformation in Mozambique’.
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It is noteworthy that some litigants take their war-related disputes, albeit 
often masked in idioms involving spirits or witchcraft, to the police or 
judicial court when, in principle, these institutions are driven by secular 
projects and it is known they have no legal mandate to deal with such 
cases, given the amnesty law. Comparative analysis can shed some light 
on these conundrums. Peter Pels has suggested that since the earlier days 
of contact between European administrators and missionaries and the 
Waluguru people (Tanzania), the former regarded magical acts as religious, 
whereas the Waluguru regarded spirits and witchcraft as ‘something to be 
countered by secular means and they failed to see why missionaries had 
to interfere, and government was loath to cooperate, in a secular measure 
for the common good’.53
When war survivors engage with the police and the justice sector in 
Mozambique, they enshroud their war-related disputes in the language 
of spirits in order to circumvent the amnesty law. State officials (district 
level) know that the amnesty law impedes both the police and the people 
from evoking serious offences of that era. Yet when the conflict appears 
enshrouded in the ‘invisible realm’,54 the police can refer the case to healers. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate course of action is contingent upon the police 
officer in charge of the police station when the problem is brought to their 
loose jurisdiction. Depending on the discretion of the officer in charge, 
there is a likelihood that a kind of handwritten subpoena is issued to 
compel one of the defendants to show up, either in the consultation yard 
of the healer or in the community court.55 Occasionally, the police officer 
can wink at the litigants and indicate that he/she is thirsty or lacking 
credit on his/her mobile phone, which means that, should the plaintiff 
pay the officer a discreetly negotiated fee on the spot, the officer can 
accelerate family reunion to try out a resolution by bringing with him/her 
the weight of the bureaucratic state structure (through wearing the police 
uniform and carrying the AK-47 weapon) to bear on the defendant who 
has refused to collaborate with family members. Still, on other occasions, 
the state official can embody state fragilities and find himself or herself 
trapped in beliefs of spirits and witchcraft both as a police officer and 
as a  human being, thereby becoming personally interested in the case. 
53  Pels, A Politics of Presence, 245.
54  Stroeken, Moral Power; West, Kupilikula; Wiegink, ‘Why Did the Soldiers Not Go Home?’.
55  Igreja, ‘The Politics of Peace’.
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Thus, the officer can show up later, out of uniform, at the healing session 
to gain further knowledge that can be instrumental to allegedly defend 
himself and the state.56
Additionally, depending on the gravity of what is at stake, the police 
commander can request the services of healers to cleanse the police station 
and vaccinate willing police officers with magical potions, given the 
putative pollution left by alleged witches who had been arrested and held 
in the police prison cells.57 Occasionally, the activities of state officials 
can expand to involve the district administrator, as was reported in 
the Ibo district of Cabo Delgado province in north Mozambique with 
a  predominantly Muslim population. The local administrator granted 
support to Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique to 
engage in compulsory homestead surveillance actions to detect alleged 
witches and punish them appropriately.58 One of those alleged witches 
was  a  maulana (a Muslim man revered for his religious learning or 
piety), who claimed that the healers invaded his house, shaved his hair 
and grabbed his Koran under the justification that they were searching 
for witchcraft.
Despite these alliances between state officials and healers, when state 
officials need a public sacrifice in order to expand broad base support and 
convey a sense of strength and control of intimate district life, they can 
arrest healers under the justification that they violate state laws by using 
excessive force and violence against alleged witches. In turn, healers can 
initiate a public defamation against the police under the justification that 
the police do not know what is required to subdue witches and maintain 
social order in their communities.59 Lastly, sometimes war survivors 
approach the police in ways that both acknowledge and rebuff their 
existence by reverting to a kind of radical metaphysics that seemingly 
makes it difficult for secular-driven mindsets to break the boundaries 
of inner logics. For example, I once participated in the resolution of 
a serious conflict involving a maternal grandfather and grandson, which 
led to a criminal offence perpetrated by the young man that almost killed 
his grandfather. After first aid was performed at the district hospital, 
the nurses referred the case to the police given that in principle only the 
56  Igreja, ‘Justice and Reconciliation in the Aftermath of the Civil War in Gorongosa’.
57  Igreja, ‘Memories of Violence’.
58  Canalmoz newspaper, Maputo, 15 April 2013.
59  Igreja, ‘Memories of Violence’.
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police have jurisdiction over serious physical injuries. When the litigants 
presented the case in the police station, they informed the police officer 
that the old man had been beaten by a spirit. The officer said ‘the spirit 
might have been very strong to cause such a serious injury’. He transferred 
the case without enquiring how a spirit could have actually inflicted the 
physical wounds the victim had in one of his ribs. Given the gravity of 
the case, which the police have sole prerogative to deal with, it is seemingly 
incomprehensible why the police officer gave full autonomy to the people 
involved by not raising questions to clarify how a spirit could have caused 
those bleeding wounds. The victim, who could hardly speak to present 
his version of the events, saw his grandson walking free from the police 
station, and they headed to the healer’s association for follow-ups.
This example elucidates that, in the relations between state agents and 
the people and among the people themselves, there are no permanent 
boundaries nor stable bricolages. These relations can be better understood 
when viewed through the lens of bargaining practices for a convenient 
order. This means that in these power contests, sometimes each side 
interpenetrates whereas at other times they raise their boundaries to 
cogently claim spaces of differentiation and autonomy, so that neither 
the interpenetration nor the sense of differentiation become a permanent 
state of affairs. Sometimes the people bond to increase their bargaining 
power. This was the case with the gamba spirits, which allowed many 
war survivors to attain personal and culturally inspired forms of justice.60 
Other times, the same people manipulate one another while establishing 
alliances with state actors (administrator, police and judiciary) to pursue 
personal interests. In turn, state actors also selectively make and break 
alliances to pursue personal and alleged state plans.
Conclusion
In closing, the notion of post-hybridity bargaining draws attention 
to the analysis of a more complex set of relations involving spirits, 
people and various state institutions and actors. These relations are 
not unidimensional  given that the various participants acknowledge 
their multiple identities as in the case of the police officer who is also 
60  Igreja et al., ‘Gamba Spirits, Gender Relations, and Healing in Post-Civil War Gorongosa, 
Mozambique’.
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a human being; a leg that cannot dance alone therefore always searches 
for a  complementary one; a person who is never complete thus always 
reverts to other persons, animals and nature more broadly, not to 
capture some sense of completeness but to reveal the sources of this 
incompleteness. In this regard, these notions and the practices they entail 
cannot be bounded by the notion of hybridity and the sense of stability 
that hybridity evokes. Post-hybridity focuses on the ongoing fashion and 
refashion of social life according to what really matters for the people in 
a given predicament.
From a policy perspective there is little doubt that the implications 
of the  processes I have described and analysed here are marred with 
complexities. While acknowledging the intricate role played by diverse 
local structures, agents and resources is an important step, it is nevertheless 
not simply a matter of hastily financing them with the expectation that 
these agents and processes can become formalised and predictable. 
The conundrum is that unpredictability and malleability are key sources 
of innovation and social change. In this way, policymaking initiatives 
should include ways of empowering existing resources and agents without 
attempting to block their creative drive. From the perspective of post-
hybridity bargaining, policy initiatives need to be experimental in most 
communities in conflict. For example, one experimental policy area could 
focus on specifically acknowledging the central role played by women 
in accountability processes for some of the serious offences committed 
during the civil war in Mozambique;61 another policy area could promote 
the organisation of women in ways that boost and spread accountability 
practices to other areas of social and political life such as marital practices, 
domestic violence, corruption in community and state institutions, and 
educational sector and economic entrepreneurship.
61  Igreja, ‘Traditional Courts’.
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